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Abstract—Several aspects of the TCP/AQM system design
are discussed that may affect performance of the network.
Namely, due to decentralized structure of the network traffic
flow control system in which traffic rate control tasks are del-
egated to autonomous agents, it may be possible for the agents
to profitably re-engineer the TCP congestion control algorithm
at the cost of the overall performance of the network. In this
paper it is shown how the commonly applied TCP/AQM de-
sign procedures may give rise to mechanisms that are prone to
attacks discreetly moving the network traffic flow away from
the desired operating point. Furthermore, a short discussion
is presented concerning the countermeasures that can be taken
to reduce these effects.
Keywords—game theory, network security, TCP/AQM, traffic
flow control.
1. Introduction
The transmission control protocol (TCP) congestion con-
trol algorithm adjusts packet transmission rate of a TCP
node to locally observed network congestion signals, usu-
ally related to the rate of incoming transmission acknowl-
edgment (ACK) messages. Since the congestion signals
close the feedback loop between the interacting network
nodes, thereby providing information about the utilization
of the network’s links, it is natural to interpret TCP and
active queue management (AQM) mechanisms as elements
of a distributed control system optimizing performance of
the network.
In this brief paper the above point of view is taken to
address a speciﬁc question regarding the expected perfor-
mance of the popular TCP/AQM designs. Namely, a dis-
cussion is presented concerning the implications that in-
formation asymmetry between the interconnected network
nodes may have on the overall performance of the network.
The discussion is supported with the formal arguments that
we have derived and studied in [1], [2].
The notion of information asymmetry which is being re-
ferred to here describes the setting in which the informa-
tion about the control goals that are addressed at the level
of a given node is not available to other nodes, but is es-
sential for the eﬃciency of the interactions. It should be
pointed out that this is a typical setting for the networked
systems in general. Indeed, it results quite naturally from
the decentralized structure of the network in which control
tasks are delegated to autonomous elements of the system.
It is the delegation of the tasks that creates an information
gap in the system and severely limits the ability to control
locally taken actions.
To be somewhat more speciﬁc about the addressed question,
let us for a moment think of the network as of a distributed
system of interacting plants, each one being controlled by
an autonomous and intelligent (active) agent. An active
agent should be identiﬁed with a network node adminis-
trator capable of implementing an arbitrary operating con-
ﬁguration of the node. Suppose next that we are faced
with the problem of designing a distributed mechanism
that leads the interacting plants, managed by the agents,
to a solution of a given system performance optimization
problem. Clearly, in the considered TCP/AQM networking
context this amounts to designing traﬃc rate control and
queue management algorithms that, if installed in the net-
work’s nodes, support reaching a desired operating point of
the network. The performance optimization problem rep-
resents preferences deﬁned with respect to the operating
point, which in turn is speciﬁed by the performance in-
dex being optimized. This brings us to the observation that
draws our attention here. A common engineering practice is
to evaluate the system’s performance by means of a scalar-
izing function, aggregating individual performance indices
of the interacting plants. Indeed, under suﬃcient regu-
larity conditions optimization of the scalarizing function
leads to Pareto-optimal outcome of the addressed multi-
objective problem, i.e., the problem in which each plant
tries to reach its optimal performance subject to the inter-
action constraints. The question of our interest is related
to the possibility of reaching the solution to the perfor-
mance optimization problem. Namely, in the addressed
asymmetric information environment the only way to cal-
culate the value of the network-wide performance index,
aggregating agents’ performance, is to process information
that the agents reveal in the course of their interactions. In
other words, performance of the system can only be op-
timized if the preferences of the agents are known to the
mechanism that coordinates the agents’ interactions. How-
ever, since the agents remain autonomous in their deci-
sions, they may ﬁnd a way to reveal a proﬁtably modiﬁed
information on their performance, thereby taking advan-
tage of the monopoly they have on the information regard-
ing their individual goals. It, therefore, becomes clear that
in such a case eﬃcient performance of the system can be
questioned.
In the following sections the above problem is addressed
in the context of the TCP/AQM control system design. It
is demonstrated that commonly applied design procedures
may give rise to mechanisms that are prone to a speciﬁc
kind of actions, or even intentional attacks, moving the
network traﬃc ﬂow away from the desired operating point.
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These attacks may seem to resemble the well known TCP
SYN ﬂooding technique, exploiting the way of establishing
a new TCP connection [3], [4]. However, as it is to be
illustrated, in the considered case the architecture of attack
is diﬀerent and may result in degradation of service rather
that in denial of service (DoS). In the following section
the countermeasures are also discussed that can be taken
by the designer of the TCP/AQM mechanisms to reduce
the potentially adverse eﬀects of distributed control under
asymmetric information. Our results are built upon the
models studied in [5]–[7], and recently in [1], [2]. Tech-
nical details concerning implementation of TCP and AQM
algorithms can be found, e.g., in [8], [9]. For a survey of
results on information asymmetry see e.g., [10].
2. Traﬃc Flow Control Mechanism
Design
Consider a network that consists of E links shared by trans-
mission streams originating from S sources. Each source
s = 1, . . . ,S is associated with a connection that is realized
between a speciﬁed source-destination pair of the network’s
nodes. The connection can be established by a collection
of Ps, s = 1, . . . ,S, paths. Multi-path routing, which is ad-
mitted in the considered setting, is deﬁned by routing ma-
trices As, s = 1, . . . ,S, consisting of elements aspe = 1 if
link e is used by the p-th route originating from source s
and aspe = 0 otherwise.
With each source there is associated a transmission per-
formance index Us, s = 1, . . . ,S. The value Us(xs) can be
interpreted as a utility that transfer rate xs ≥ 0 has to the
source. Similarly, with each link e = 1, . . . ,E there is asso-
ciated a performance index Ce deﬁning value of cost Ce(ye)
at which network link serves ﬂow ye ≥ 0 of incoming data.
A two-step design procedure will be now discussed that is
usually applied to engineer a stable and eﬃcient process
of network traﬃc ﬂow control. In the ﬁrst step, a refer-
ence point for the design is deﬁned to represent a preferred
outcome of the network performance optimization prob-
lem. In the second step, based on the desired performance
conditions satisﬁed by the selected reference point, a dy-
namic system is constructed that is guaranteed to converge
to a neighborhood of the reference point. The deﬁnition of
the dynamic system is then used as a design guideline for
the algorithms implemented in the network.
Let us illustrate the above procedure. The basic problem
that underlies current designs of TCP/AQM algorithms,
mostly due to [5], [11], is deﬁned as follows:
SYSTEM(U,A,c) :∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
maximize ∑
s
Us(xs)
subject to AT x ≤ c
over xs ≥ 0, s = 1, ...,S,
where cT = [c1, . . . ,ce] is a vector of ﬁxed capacities of the
links. A problem SYSTEM deﬁnes the reference point for
the design of distributed network ﬂow control system. As
it can be easily seen, the basic problem is multi-objective,
with the objectives deﬁned by the performance indices of
the network elements given by functions Us, s = 1, . . . ,S,
andCe, e = 1, . . . ,E. In the above formulation, eﬃcient (un-
dominated) solutions are searched for by means of a simple
(utilitarian or maxisum) scalarization. For other interest-
ing approaches see, e.g., [12]–[15]. Notice that a single
path routing matrix A is used here. Furthermore, it follows
that Ce(ye) = 0 for 0 ≤ ye ≤ ce and Ce(ye) = +∞ whenever
ye > ce.
The following sequence of arguments supports the con-
struction of a distributed traﬃc ﬂow control system that
is intended to lead the network to a neighborhood of the
reference point deﬁned above. Suppose that each source
submits to the network a bid θs ≥ 0 denoting willingness
to pay for the traﬃc rate xs = θs/λs ≥ 0, where λs ≥ 0 can
be regarded as a charge per unit traﬃc ﬂow. Let us also
assume that each source, taking λs = ∑e aseµe > 0 as given,
chooses θs that maximizes payoff related to the assigned
transfer rate, i.e., it solves the problem:
USERs(Us,λs) :∣∣∣∣∣
maximize Us (θs/λs)−θs
over θs ≥ 0.
Next, suppose that given the vector θ = (θ1, . . . ,θS) of
bids, the network calculates prices (Lagrange multipli-
ers, congestion signals) µe ≥ 0, e = 1, . . . ,E, and rates
xs ≥ 0, s = 1, . . . ,S, solving the problem:
NETWORK(A,c,θ ) :∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
maximize ∑
s
θs log(xs)
subject to AT x ≤ c
over xs ≥ 0, s = 1, . . . ,S.
The reason for application of the speciﬁc form of utility
function, Us(xs) = θs log(xs), will become clear in a mo-
ment. Theorem 1, presented below, shows that under the
assumption that the sources take the feedback signals ¯λ as
given, a feasible network traﬃc ﬂow can be found, which is
arbitrarily close to solution of the problem SYSTEM(U,A,c).
Namely, the ﬂow can be reached by a distributed algorithm
that solves the problem NETWORK(A,c,θ (t)) at instant t and,
on a larger time scale, drives θ (t) to ¯θ deﬁning optimal
solution to SYSTEM(U,A,c).
Theorem 1: Suppose that Us is an increasing, strictly con-
cave and continuously diﬀerentiable function over xs ≥ 0
for i = 1, . . . ,n. There exist vectors ¯λ = (¯λ1, . . . , ¯λn), ¯θ =
( ¯θ1, . . . , ¯θn) and x¯ = (x¯1, . . . , x¯n) such that:
– ¯θs solves USERs(Us, ¯λs), s = 1, . . . ,S;
– x¯ solves NETWORK(A,c, ¯θ ) and SYSTEM(U,A,c);
– ¯θs = ¯λsx¯s, s = 1, . . . ,S;
Proof: For the proof see, e.g., [5].
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Based on the above result, a distributed traﬃc ﬂow con-
trol algorithm can be derived from the following system of
diﬀerential equations:
RATE(A,q,θ ) :∣∣∣∣∣∣
dxs
dt (t) = κ
[
θs− xs(t)∑e aseµe(t)] , s = 1, . . . ,S,
µe(t) = qe(∑s asexs(t)), e = 1, . . . ,E.
System RATE(A,q,θ ) describes a network-wide traﬃc rate
adjustment process, xs(t), s = 1, . . . ,S, with feedback pro-
vided to each network node by congestion signals µe(t),
e = 1, . . . ,E. By construction, the system exploits the prop-
erties of the equilibrium point described in Theorem 1,
applying function ¯Us(xs) = θs log(xs), s = 1, . . . ,S, as
a model of preference indicator applied by each traf-
ﬁc source. Precisely, the construction of the desired dis-
tributed control algorithm rests on the following result.
Given a ﬁxed signal θs, s = 1, . . . ,S, and a well-behaved
and suitably designed function qe, e = 1, . . . ,E, system
RATE(A,q,θ ) converges to minimum of function:
∑
e
∫ y
0
qe(s)ds−∑
s
θs logxs, with y = ∑
s
asexs. (1)
It follows that by letting the sources periodically up-
date signals θs, a neighborhood of solution to problem
SYSTEM(U,A,c) can be reached. Indeed, suppose that each
source applies the following control rule:
θs(t) = xs(t)U ′s(xs(t)), s = 1, . . . ,S, (2)
where U ′s ≡ dUs/dxs. It can be demonstrated that the above
evolution of θ (t) deﬁnes TCP traﬃc rates x(t) that converge
to a stable point x¯ minimizing:
∑
e
∫ y
0
qe(s)ds−∑
s
Us(xs), with y = ∑
s
asexs. (3)
For a suitable choice of function qe, e = 1, . . . ,E, rep-
resenting an AQM policy, the above function arbitrarily
closely approximates objective in SYSTEM(U,A,c). Thus
vector x¯ of traﬃc rate solves relaxation of the network per-
formance optimization problem. Details concerning practi-
cal implementations of the above algorithm can be found,
e.g., in [16]–[22].
Example: FAST TCP algorithm
To control the rate at which packets are transmitted, the
FAST TCP algorithm updates the amount of data trans-
mitted into the network at a given time, based on the
observed average round-trip time and average queuing
delay [23]–[18]. The amount of transmitted data is deﬁned
by the value of the TCP networking stack variable denot-
ing the congestion window size, ws ≥ 0. Precisely, a FAST
TCP node s adapts control variable ws according to the
following rule:
ws(t + 1) = γ
(
dsws(t)
ds + λs(t)
+ θs
)
+(1− γ)ws(t), (4)
where ds ≥ 0 denotes the round-trip propagation delay,
λs ≥ 0 denotes the round-trip queuing delay observed by
source s and γ ∈ (0,1]. The algorithm can be proved to
converge to the following operating point of the network:
w¯s = ¯θs + x¯sds, ¯λs = ¯θs/x¯s = ¯U ′s(x¯s). (5)
In simple terms, in the above equilibrium point source s
maintains ¯θs = x¯s ¯λs packets in the buﬀers along its path
and x¯sds packets in the transmission lines. It should also
be noticed that for the equilibrium to be practically imple-
mentable, it is necessary that the total amount of buﬀer-
ing in the network be at least ∑s ¯θs, i.e., the transmission
delay (or, so called, budget) balancing condition must be
satisﬁed.
3. Anticipative Flow Control: Design
and Countermeasures
By the above description, the TCP/AQM ﬂow control sys-
tem deﬁnes target equilibrium conditions for the network.
Precisely, these conditions are built into the TCP/AQM con-
trol rules in order to lead the network of interacting nodes
to the solution of problem NETWORK, desired by the con-
trol system designer. It will be now argued that in the
considered distributed environment the TCP/AQM control
system may be prone to attacks if the concept of infor-
mation asymmetry is not taken into account in the control
system design.
The TCP/AQM mechanisms are commonly known to the
network users managing their network nodes. At the same
time, the network users are autonomous in choosing their
protocol implementations and are capable of modifying the
parameters of the applied traﬃc ﬂow control algorithms. In
other words, there exists a natural information asymmetry
between the network users. In particular, such an asymme-
try exists between the network users adjusting their trans-
mission rates and the network manager allocating traﬃc
forwarding resources. Let us stick to this setting to illus-
trate how the information asymmetry may create incentives
for the network users to implement feedback-anticipating
strategies in their rate control algorithms.
The idea which underlies the construction of such control
rules is quite simple: the network users should reveal to
the network a suitably reduced level of demand for traﬃc
ﬂow.
Indeed, since the network is required to satisfy the observed
demand, its reduced level may give rise to lower levels of
congestion signals that provide network-wide feedback on
the utilization of resources. As a result, the network users
may expect to receive an improved level of payoﬀs (indi-
vidual performance indices) from the traﬃc rates admitted
by the network.
To implement the above anticipative rate control strat-
egy, a network user may modify the rule according to
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which θs(t) is updated in the original TCP design. Namely,
source s may submit signal:
θs(t) = xs(t) ˜U ′s(xs(t)), (6)
where ˜U ′s(xs(t)) <U ′s(xs(t)). If the above bidding rule is ap-
plied, the network is informed that marginal performance
gain that source s receives from the rate at which it sends
that traﬃc is lower than it is in reality. Precisely, this infor-
mation is propagated in the network through the congestion
window size forming burstiness of the traﬃc. As a conse-
quence the network’s operating point is modiﬁed.
The above conclusion can be clearly illustrated with the
example of equilibrium point conditions given by Eq. (5).
Under anticipative rate control one may expect a neighbor-
hood of the following operating point to be reached:
wˆs = ˆθs + xˆsds, ˆλs = ˆθs/xˆs = ˜U ′s(xˆs) < ¯U ′s(x¯s) = ¯θs/x¯s. (7)
This observation shows that under anticipative rate control
the network traﬃc ﬂow should be expected to deviate from
the solution to NETWORK problem. Also, notice that by the
above description the strategy may be quite easily imple-
mented by the administrator of a network node.
Clearly, an experimental study is necessary to identify per-
formance characteristics of the discussed process, espe-
cially under traﬃc demand shaped by a stochastic process.
Nonetheless, formal studies suggest that one may expect
to observe substantial performance variations. An impor-
tant game-theoretic model of outcomes reachable under the
discussed strategy can be found in [6], [7]. Namely, it is
demonstrated that the network-wide eﬃciency of outcomes
may fall by approximately 1/3 relative to the reference so-
lution of problem SYSTEM. In [2] the proposed model is
further developed to investigate the outcomes that are reach-
able individually by each agent. In particular, referring to
the reference point properties, in equilibrium of the traf-
ﬁc ﬂow control process with feedback-anticipating agents
competing for a single link:
– each agent communicates reduced demand to the net-
work, which leads to reduced charge per unit traﬃc
ﬂow and reduced utilization of the link capacity;
– some of the agents (but not all) may be allocated
improved rates, in case of which they also receive
improved payoﬀs;
– some of the agents (but not all) may receive improved
payoﬀs with reduced rates;
– commonly applied truthful preference revelation can-
not be strictly dominated by commonly applied an-
ticipative strategy with respect to the traﬃc rates in-
dividually received by each agent.
In light of the above predictions, an immediate question
arises whether it is possible to reduce the potentially ad-
verse eﬀects of the feedback-anticipation and keep the op-
erating point of the traﬃc ﬂow in a neighborhood of the
reference point. This issue is addressed in [1]. The en-
vironment in which the network performance optimiza-
tion problem is addressed here, is assumed to be char-
acterized by the following properties. First, the problem
can be decomposed with respect to control (independent)
variables xi, i = 1, . . . ,n, and interaction (dependent) vari-
ables y j, j = 1, . . . ,m. Second, the problem of calculating
xi is delegated to a designated agent i = 1, . . . ,n, whereas
the interaction variables y j, j = 1, . . . ,m, remain managed
by the network manager. Finally, in order to calculate con-
trol inputs xi, i = 1, . . . ,n, the agents actively exploit the
ﬁrst-order optimality conditions satisﬁed by the commonly
known reference point, i.e., a solution to the network per-
formance optimization problem. The following theorem is
proved.
Theorem 2: Consider the following problem:
P( f j, j = 0, . . . ,m) :∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
minimize f0(x,y) over (x,y) ∈ Rn×Rm
subject to f j(x,y) = 0, j = 1, . . . ,m,
n,m > 0, f j ∈ C 2, j = 0, . . . ,m.
Suppose that f j(x,y) = ∑i f ji(xi)+ g j(y) for j = 0, . . . ,m.
Let z¯ = (x¯, y¯) be a point for which the second-order neces-
sary optimality conditions for P hold with det∇yF(x¯, y¯) 6= 0.
Suppose also that for x ∈ Bε (x¯) = {x : ‖x¯−x‖ ≤ ε, ε > 0}
functions ηi, i = 1, . . . ,n, are deﬁned by:

∂ηi
∂xi
(x) = ∑ j p j(x)
∂ f ji
∂xi
(xi), i = 1, . . . ,n,
p(x)≡−
(∂FT
∂y (x,Y(x))
)−1 ∂ f0
∂y (x,Y(x)),
F(x,Y(x))≡ 0,
(8)
and for any v ∈ Rn \ {0} the following condition holds:
vT
∂YT
∂x (x¯)
∂ 2H
∂y2 (x¯,p(x¯))
∂Y
∂xT (x¯)v > 0, (9)
where H(x,p(x)) = f0(x,Y(x))+ p(x)T F(x,Y(x)). Then
z¯ is an isolated solution to problem P and also a unique
solution to system:
PAYOFFi( f0i, x¯i,x−i), i = 1, . . . ,n :∣∣∣∣∣
minimize Ji(xi,x−i) = f0i(xi)+ ηi(x)
over xi ∈ Bε (x¯i),
where x−i = (x1, . . . ,xi−1,xi+1, . . . ,xn).
Proof: Presented in [1]. The proof is based on the
classic elimination approach, according to which the con-
strained problem is reduced to an unconstrained one with
m dependent (interaction or basic) variables expressed in
terms of n independent (control) variables. At the same
time, however, it should be emphasized that in the ana-
lyzed environment the applied approach serves as a model
of reasoning that is followed by intelligent agents exploit-
ing the commonly available information on the performance
optimization goal.
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Theorem 2 speciﬁes suﬃcient conditions for implementa-
tion of a regular local solution to problem P in a Nash
equilibrium point of a noncooperative feedback-anticipation
game. Precisely, the theorem shows how to design pay-
oﬀs Ji, i = 1, . . . ,n, in order to reach solution to problem
P in a Nash equilibrium point. By construction the payoﬀs
remain invariant with respect to the ﬁrst-order variations of
the feedback variables, modeled by p(x). This property
maintains compatibility of the performance optimization
goal with the private goals of the interacting agents. Fur-
thermore, the theorem describes a game (or control mech-
anism) design procedure that exploits local properties of
a feasible solution for problem P in order to deﬁne a col-
lection of games (mechanisms) that coordinate interactions
of the feedback-anticipating agents in the neighborhood of
the feasible solution.
Detailed analysis of the equilibrium point deﬁned by a solu-
tion to system PAYOFFi, i = 1, . . . ,n, supports the following
collection of conjectures:
– if all agents apply the feedback-anticipating strategy
to calculate the controls optimizing payoﬀs Ji, i =
1, . . . ,n, then they implement the performance opti-
mization goal by autonomously acting in their own
best interest (incentive compatibility condition);
– since no proﬁtable distortions of the feedback vari-
ables (i.e. misrepresentations of preferences) are
reachable under the applied rules of the game, it is
optimal for the agents to calculate their controls by
taking the best responses to the observed values of
feedback variables;
– in equilibrium the feedback (dual) variables are as-
signed values equal to those that would be obtained
if the network had enough information to solve P in
a centralized manner.
The above conclusions provide motivation for the search of
iterative and distributed procedures that may lead the strate-
gically interacting agents to the operating point, maximiz-
ing performance of the network under asymmetric informa-
tion. Indeed, since the non-anticipative control is equiva-
lent to the optimal anticipative one in equilibrium point of
the game deﬁned by system PAYOFFi, i = 1, . . . ,n,, the di-
rect preference revelation strategy, given by Eq. (2), may be
used at the network traﬃc source level to control the rate of
transmission. However, for this strategy to be implemented
by the feedback-anticipating agents, it is necessary for the
network to provide suﬃcient rate control incentives to the
agents. By Theorem 2 these incentives can be given the
following form:
¯ηs(λs,xs) = xsλs− ¯hs(xs), i = 1, . . . ,n, (10)
¯hs(xs) = ∑
e
∫ xs
0
asesdqe(s+ ∑
k 6=s
akexk)−bs(x−s), (11)
where λs = ∑e aseqe(ye), s = 1, . . . ,S, and bs(x−s) is the
transmission delay (or budget) balancing component. Thus
in equilibrium source s transmits packets at rate x¯s if it in-
curs transmission cost ¯ηs(¯λs, x¯s). The corresponding charge
per unit traﬃc ﬂow for i should, therefore, be deﬁned by:
λ ∗s = max{ ¯λs− ¯hs(x¯s)/x¯s,0}. (12)
This result can be given the following interpretation. Sup-
pose that λ ∗s > 0 with ¯hs(x¯s) > 0 for some x¯s > 0. In such
a case, source s is motivated to adjusts its rate to x¯s if it ob-
serves average delay of λ ∗s < ¯λs, which would correspond
to θ ∗s = ¯θs − ¯hs(x¯s) < ¯θs packets maintained in the buﬀers
along the routing paths for w∗s = w¯s − ¯hs(x¯s) < w¯s. Hence,
the network motivates the source to optimally adjust its rate
by providing to it the quality of service (QoS) parameters
that are improved in comparison to those arising as a so-
lution to NETWORK problem. This implies that the network
must be capable of providing diﬀerentiated services to the
interacting sources, for example by applying suitable active
queue management (AQM) techniques.
Although the above requirements can be supported by the
currently available networking technology, it is clear that
the traﬃc engineering cost imposed by the mechanism may
be substantial. Indeed, game theory shows that for a wide
class of problems it is impossible to avoid the costs of
Nash equilibrium design; for details see, e.g., [25]–[28].
Namely, gains from reaching a desired solution to the per-
formance optimization problem need not balance the losses
corresponding to the introduction of incentives that make
this solution attainable in a noncooperative game, i.e., un-
der asymmetric information. These costs must be incurred
by the coordinator through violation of the balancing con-
dition, or by the agents through violation of the rational
participation constraint. Theorem 2, presented above, can
be applied to give quantitative characterization of theses
costs as well. In general, in the considered networking
context Theorem 2 implies that:
– under anticipative traﬃc ﬂow control it may be more
desirable for the network manager to reach a sub-
optimal traﬃc ﬂow than the optimal one requiring
additional coordination costs;
– costs of counterspeculation can be managed, at least
to some extent, by a proper design of coordination
instruments and by a choice of interaction variables
in the network, where the interaction variables rep-
resent capacities of the actively managed queues in
the network;
– cost of reaching the reference point may discourage
some of the agents from participation in the game,
i.e., some of the sources may receive payoﬀs that are
below their expectations;
– counterspeculation may be an option for the network
manager only if the balancing condition can be sat-
isﬁed.
The above costs of reaching the desired operating point of
the network can be intuitively related to the information
monopoly that exists in the considered class of distributed
systems. Since it is not possible to fully eliminate the costs
35
Michał P. Karpowicz
of enforcing incentive compatibility, these costs may play
the key role in the control system design decision-making
process.
4. Design Framework For Traﬃc Flow
Control Mechanisms
The discussion in the previous sections brings us to the
concept of a procedure that can be applied to engineer
a distributed process of traﬃc ﬂow control under asym-
metric information. The idea that underlies the design is
to refer to the constructions described by Theorem 2 in or-
der to harmonize interactions of the feedback-anticipating
agents and incentivize them to reach the reference solution
to the network performance optimization problem. Let us
now give an overview of the procedure. The question of
algorithm design and implementation is omitted here, since
several related remarks and suggestions have already been
made in the previous sections.
First, a reference point for the design should be deﬁned
to describe a desired performance proﬁle of the network.
The following (quite standard) optimization problem can be
proposed to serve as a model of preferences deﬁned with
respect to the operational performance of the network:
TRAFFIC(U,C,A) :∣∣∣∣∣∣
maximize ∑
s
Us(∑
p
xsp)−∑
e
Ce(∑
s
∑
p
xspaspe)
over xsp ≥ 0, s = 1, . . . ,S, p = 1, . . . ,Ps.
Thus the reference point for the design is deﬁned as a solu-
tion x¯ to problem TRAFFIC(U,C,A). Notice that the multi-
path routing problem is considered here in which ﬂows
originating from source s may follow more than one route
to destination.
As we have already argued, due to decentralized nature of
the network, speciﬁcations of the utility functions Us, s =
1, . . . ,S, and the cost functions Ce, e = 1, . . . ,E, are known
only locally. To engineer a network-wide control process
in the addressed asymmetric information environment we
propose to follow a coordination-based approach in which
an attempt is made to decompose the reference solution and
to build it into the local control rules at the level of net-
working elements. For this purpose, two sets of auxiliary
problems can be deﬁned associated with the network links
and traﬃc sources, respectively.
4.1. Link-Control Problem
The ﬁrst set of problems is given the following form:
LINKe(ye), e = 1, . . . ,E :∣∣∣∣∣
maximize ηe(z,ye)−Qe(z)
over z ≥ ye.
Problem LINKe is intended to provide a description of the
following link behavior pattern: based on a observed in-
coming data transfer rate ye ≥ 0 select a feasible operat-
ing service rate z ≥ 0 such that QoS targets are met. The
corresponding mechanism design problem is to construct
functions ηe and Qe for each e = 1, . . . ,E that make the
above behavior pattern implementable.
4.2. Transfer Rate Control
The second set of optimization problems is given the fol-
lowing form:
SOURCEs(µ ), s = 1, . . . ,S :∣∣∣∣∣
maximize Us(zs(xs))− ¯ηs(µ ,xs)
subject to xsp ≥ 0, p = 1, . . . ,Ps.
Problem SOURCEs(µ ) models behavior of source s adjusting
its data transfer rate zs(xs), distributed according to xs along
the set of routing paths, to the observed coordination signals
µ providing information about utilization of resources in
the network. In this case the corresponding design problem
is to construct functions Us, zs and ¯ηs, s = 1, . . . ,S that
support eﬃcient adaptation of transfer rates over optimized
set of paths, and lead the sources to the reference solution
of problem TRAFFIC(U,C,A).
5. Summary
Our intention here was to point out several aspects of the
TCP/AQM system design that may aﬀect its performance.
It has been argued that due to decentralized structure of
the network traﬃc ﬂow control system, in which traﬃc rate
control tasks are delegated to autonomous agents and coor-
dinated by means of the network congestion signals, it may
be possible (for the agents managing the traﬃc sources)
to proﬁtably re-engineer the TCP congestion control algo-
rithm at the cost of the overall performance of the network.
Since the formulated conjectures have been derived from
our theoretic considerations, we ﬁnd it necessary to verify
them experimentally. From this point of view this paper
can therefore be taken as a proposal for further studies.
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